Introduction
With the growth of open networks such as Internet, the problem of fair exchange has become one of the fundamental problems in secure electronic transactions and digital rights management. Payment systems, contract signing, electronic commerce and certified e-mail are classical examples in which fairness is a relevant security property. Informally, an exchange protocol allows two distributed parties to exchange electronic data in an efficient and fair manner, and it is said to be fair if it ensures that during the exchange of items, no party involved in the : 747 protocol can gain a significant advantage over the other party, even if the protocol is halted for any reason.
Significant effort has been devoted to the study of the fair exchange problem. Fair exchange protocols can be broadly categorized into three types:
(i) Gradual exchange protocols, (ii) Protocols requiring an online trusted third party (TTP), (iii) Protocols requiring an off-line TTP.
The first one is that two parties exchange data simultaneously. A simplified example to provide simultaneity is that they disclose the secret data bit by bit. This kind of scheme has a drawback that it requires many steps of interactions for exchanging data. In addition, one of these two parties will have an advantage of obtaining one more bit if he maliciously aborts in the middle of the protocol. The second approach is that an on-line TTP who acts as a mediator receives the data from both parties in each transaction and then forwards them to the accurate receivers [1] .
However, TTP would become a bottleneck on communications since he takes part in all transactions, including the normal cases in which two parties honestly deliver their data. To improve the performance, optimistic fair exchange protocols based on an off-line TTP have been proposed. An optimistic fair exchange protocol usually involves three parties: users Alice and Bob, as well as an off-line TTP. The off-line TTP does not participate the actual exchange protocol in normal cases, and is invoked only in abnormal cases to dispute the arguments between Alice and Bob to ensure fairness.
Asokan, et al. [2] were the first to formally study the problem of optimistic fair exchanges. They presented several provably secure but highly interactive solutions, based on the concept of verifiable encryption of signatures.
Their approach was later generalized by Ref. [3] , but all these schemes involved expensive and highly interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the exchange phase. Other less formal works on interactive verifiably encrypted signatures include Refs. [4, 5] . Ateniese [5] proposed six schemes for fair exchanges, while two of which were shown to be vulnerable to colluding attacks [6] . The first and only non-interactive verifiably encrypted signature scheme was constructed by Boneh, et al. [7] , which is very elegant and provably secure in the random oracle model. Shamir [8] firstly introduced the notion of identity-based (ID-based) cryptography in 1984. The main idea of ID-based cryptosystems is that the identity information of each user works as his/her public key, in other words, the user's public key can be calculated directly from his/her identity rather than being extracted from a certificate issued by a certificate authority (CA). Identity-based public key setting can be a good alternative for certificate-based public key setting, especially when efficient key management and moderate security are required.
But up to now, no one proposes an identity-based optimistic fair exchange protocol. Our current work is aimed at filling this void. Motivated by the approaches of verifiable probabilistic signatures [9] and verifiably committed signatures [10] , we introduce a new paradigm for fair exchanges, called identity-based partial proxy signature. We present a formal model of ID-based partial proxy signatures, and propose an efficient and provably secure partial proxy signature scheme. As far as we know, the vast majority of fair exchange protocols require the use of zero knowledge proofs, which is the most computationally intensive part of the exchange protocol. Using proxy features of our model, we construct protocols that require no zero knowledge proofs in the exchange phase, and TTP does not need to maintain partial private key of each user which can be used to resolve a dispute. This will greatly reduce the communication overhead and managing cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains some preliminaries used in our scheme.
In Section 3, we present an ID-based partial proxy signature scheme and formally analyze its security. In Section 4, an optimistic fair exchange protocol based on the scheme is proposed. And we end with concluding remarks in Section 5. 
Definitions

The bilinear pairing
Let G be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and V be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. Let e:G×G→V be a pairing which satisfies the following conditions:
1. Bilinearity: For any P,Q,R∈G, we have e(P+Q,R)=e(P,R)e(Q,R) and e(P,Q+R)=e(P,Q)e(P,R). In particular, for any a,b∈Z q , e(aP,bP)=e(P,P) ab =e(P,abP)=e(abP,P).
2.
Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q∈G, such that e(P,Q)≠1.
3.
Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q∈G.
The typical way of obtaining such pairings is by deriving them from the weil-pairing or the tate-pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q and P be a generator of G.
1.
The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is to decide whether c=ab in Z/qZ for given P,aP,bP,cP∈G. If so, (P,aP,bP,cP) is called a valid Diffie-Hellman (DH) tuple.
2.
The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is to compute abP for given P,aP,bP∈G.
Now we present a definition for a gap Diffie-Hellman(GDH) group.
Definition 1.
A group G is a gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group if the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in G can be efficiently computable and there exists no efficient algorithm breaking computational Diffie-Hellman on G.
If we have an admissible bilinear pairing e in G, we can solve the DDH problem in G efficiently as follows:
(P,aP,bP,cP) is a valid DH tuple ⇔e(aP,bP)=e(P,cP).
Hence an elliptic curve becomes an instance of a GDH group if the Weil (or the Tate) pairing is efficiently computable and the CDH is sufficiently hard on the curve.
ID-Based setting from bilinear pairings
The ID-based public key systems allow some public information of the user such as name, address and email etc., rather than an arbitrary string to be used as his public key. The private key of the user is calculated by a trusted party, called PKG and sent to the user via a secure channel.
ID-based public key setting from bilinear pairings can be implemented as follows:
Let G be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and V be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. A bilinear pairing is the map e:G×G→V. Define cryptographic hash function H:{0,1} * →G.
• g: PKG chooses a random number * q s Z ∈ and sets P pub =sP. He publishes system parameters params={G,V,e,q,P,P pub ,H} and keeps s secretly as the master-key.
• k: A user submits his/her identity information ID and authenticates him to PKG. PKG computes the user's private key d ID =sQ ID =sH(ID) and sends it to the user via a secure channel.
Proxy signature
The basic idea of most existing proxy signature schemes is as follows. The original signer sends a specific message with its signature to the proxy signer, who then uses this information to construct a proxy private key. With private key, the proxy signer can generate proxy signatures by employing a specified standard signature scheme.
When a proxy signature is given, a verifier first computes the proxy public key from some public information, and then checks its validity according to the corresponding standard signature verification procedure.
A secure proxy signature scheme should satisfy the following four requirements [11] :
: 749 Verifiability: From the proxy signature, a verifier can be convinced of the original signer's agreement on the signed message.
Strong unforgeability: Only the designated proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. In other words, the original signer and other third parties who are not designated as a proxy signer cannot create a valid proxy signature. So it should also satisfy strong undeniability: Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature on behalf of an original signer, he cannot repudiate the signature creation against anyone else.
Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from a proxy signature.
Prevention of misuse:
The proxy signer cannot use the proxy key for purposes other than generating a valid proxy signature. In case of misuse, the responsibility of the proxy signer should be determined explicitly.
ID-Based Partial Proxy Signatures
In the following, we would like to present an ID-based partial proxy signature scheme, and explicitly consider the attack models and security goals, which results in a concrete description for the security against all parties involved in the protocols.
ID-Based partial proxy signature scheme
We shall present an ID-based partial proxy signature scheme based on the standard ID-based proxy signature scheme [12] . An ID-based partial proxy signature scheme involves three entities: a signer Alice, a verifier Bob and an arbitrator TTP. As usual, let k be a security parameter, G be a GDH group of prime order q>2 k generated by P, and Compute
The proxy signature and partial proxy signature on m is
respectively.
Ver and Pver:
To verify a proxy signature σ=(U p ,V p ,m ω ,U ω ) on message m, the algorithm Ver checks 4 ( , Remark:
(1) Recall that in a verifiable committed signature scheme [10] and most of the verifiable encrypted signature schemes, TTP shall maintain a secret-public key pair for each user via a registration phase, and the secret keys will then be used to resolve a dispute. In our partial proxy signature scheme, TTP only needs to publish a public system parameter and generate a warrant ω. No further registration is needed and no zero-knowledge proofs are involved, which will greatly reduce the communication overhead and managing cost.
(2) In the Setup phase, the private key of TTP is computed by its identity and public parameter TPK, which efficiently prevents the adversary from changing TPK.
(3) In our partial proxy signature scheme, the standard ID-based proxy signature scheme can be replaced by any other secure proxy signature scheme.
Correctness:
The correctness of an ID-based partial proxy signature scheme states that
Res(m,σ′,TSK),ID T ,ID A ,TPK)=1
The correctness of the above scheme is obvious.
Security of ID-based partial proxy signatures
The security of ID-based partial proxy signatures consists of ensuring three aspects: security against signer Alice, security against verifier Bob, and security against arbitrator TTP. In the following, we denote by O Psig an oracle simulating partial proxy signing procedure, O Res an oracle simulating the resolution procedure, and O Ext an oracle simulating private key extraction procedure. Let k be a security parameter, and PPT stand for "probabilistic polynomial time" (in the security parameter).
Security against a signer. We require that any PPT adversary A succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment: where Setup * denotes the run of Setup with dishonest Alice (run by the adversary A) and is A's state after this run. In other words, Alice should not be able to produce partial signature σ′ which looks good to Bob, but which will not be opened into Alice's full signature by the honest TTP. Security against an arbitrator. This property is crucial. Even though the arbitrator TTP is semi-trusted, the primary signer Alice does not want TTP to produce a valid proxy signature which she did not intend on producing.
To achieve this goal, we require that any PPT adversary A associated with partial proxy signing oracle O Psig and private key extraction oracle O Ext , succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment: Proof: Note that the underlying ID-based proxy signature scheme Sig is secure against forgery in GDH groups [12] . Similarly we can show that ID-based partial proxy signature scheme Psig is also secure against forgery in GDH groups.
According to Definition 2, we shall show that the proposed partial proxy signature scheme is secure against signer, verifier and arbitrator. to forge a valid proxy signature σ, for which the corresponding partial proxy signature σ′ has not been queried to O Res . Suppose adversary verifier B is successful in such an attack, we show how to construct an algorithm Φ that solves CDH problem in G. This will contradict the fact that G is GDH group.
Algorithm Φ is given X=xP∈G and Y=yP∈G. Its goal is to output xY=xyP∈G. Algorithm Φ simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary B as follows.
Φ picks randomly P pub ∈G, and initializes B with (P,P pub ,P′=X) as a system parameter.
To respond to the random oracle queries, Φ maintains a list L For other random oracle queries, Φ makes similar answers.
When B requests the private key associated to an identity ID i , Φ recovers the corresponding 〈ID i ,b i 〉 from L 1 . It means that H 1 (ID i ) was previously defined to be b i P and b i P pub is then returned to B as a private key associated to 
Secure against arbitrator's attack: Now we consider an adversarial TTP's attack. We shall convert such an attack into a forger Φ against the underlying ID-based proxy signature scheme [12] . Note that Φ takes as input 
Finally when TTP outputs the forgery (m,σ), Φ also outputs the same forgery. We see that the simulation is perfect.
The above arguments show that, if an adversary can attack our partial proxy signature scheme, then one can solve CDH problem in G.
Fair Exchanges Based on Partial Proxy Signature
Now we present an optimistic fair exchange protocol based on the partial proxy signature scheme described in Section 3.
Let G be a GDH group of prime order q generated by P. PKG picks a random master key s∈ and sets P Security of the protocol follows directly from Theorem 1.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel method for constructing efficient ID-based optimistic fair exchange protocols using partial proxy signature. We introduce a formal definition of partial proxy signature and propose an efficient and provably secure partial proxy signature scheme. The resulting optimistic fair exchange protocol does not involve zero knowledge proofs in the exchange phase, and TTP does not maintain partial private key of each user which can be used to resolve a dispute, which greatly reduces the communication overhead and managing cost. This is the first efficient ID-based optimistic fair exchange protocol. *************************************************************************************************************** 
(CCVRV 2007)
